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COMMENTS
LABOR LAW -

RIGHT TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AS

AFFECTED BY UNION-MANAGEMENT RETIREMENT AGREEMENTS-

Under what circumstances has an employee "voluntarily" left work so
as to disqualify him from receiving benefits under an unemployment
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compensation act? 1 This general question has troubled the courts
for a considerable time and has presented itself in a variety of fact
situations, e.g., leaving work because of labor disputes2 and for personal reasons. 3 The courts' interpretation of the meaning of "voluntarily" has generally been influenced by numerous considerations such
as the policy behind unemployment compensation, the specific terminology of the statute involved, and the procedure for financing the plans.
The specific problem with which this comment deals is summarized in
the following question: when an employee leaves his employment by
reason of a union contract calling for his retirement by the employer
at a given age plus receipt of a pension, is such employee barred from
benefits under an unemployment compensation act because his leaving
is "voluntary"? The decisions of the administrative and judicial bodies
that have dealt with this issue4 have been far from unanimous. Since
a basic knowledge of the typical unemployment compensation act is
necessary for an understanding of the problem, an attempt will be made
to summarize those statutory provisions which are pertinent. An
examination will then be made of the reasoning by which the courts,
tribunals and writers reach one or the other result. Finally, there will
be singled out for particular attention some of the analytical fallacies
and pitfalls which tend to obscure the real issues and complicate the
process by which decisions in this area are reached.

I. Statutory Background
Pertinent Provisions of Unemployment Insurance Acts. Unemployment compensation acts exist in all 48 states, Alaska, Hawaii, and
the District of Columbia.5 The typical act contains, among other matters, a declaration of policy, an eligibility provision and a disqualification clause. One of the disqualification sections relates to the nature
1 An example of the typical wording of such acts is found in the New Jersey statute:
" ... an individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (a) For the week in which he has left
work voluntarily without good cause.•.." N.J. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 43, §21-5(a).
2 See 25 WASH. L. REv. 50, 99 (1950); 36 h.L. B.J. 364 (1948).
3 See Peterson, "Unemployment Insurance in Colorado-Eligibility and Disqualification," 25 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 180 at 191 (1953).
4 Under the unemployment compensation statutes of the states, the great majority of
appeals from unemployment benefit determinations are settled by administrative tribunals.
5 For a list of the citations of the unemployment compensation acts of all tlie states
as of 1948, see 10 Omo ST. L.J. 238, n. 2 (1949). In some quarters it is believed that
unemployment compensation should be placed on a federal level. Haber and Joseph, "Appraising the Social Security Program-Unemployment Compensation," 202 ANNALS 22 at 31
(1939); FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORTS 43 (1949). Cf. 30 AM. LAB.
LEc. REv. 151 (1940).
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of the employee's termination of his employment. During the early
development of these statutes many of them did not disqualify a claimant who voluntarily left his job, but since the early 1940's, such provisions have become increasingly prevalent. Today they exist in every
state. 6 According to one writer,7 this helps carry out the policy behind
unemployment compensation by aiding those workers whose unemployment is caused by lack of work but not those who are unemployed
through their own fault. However, in only one state does a voluntary
discontinuance of work cause automatic disqualification.8 In all other
states, a claimant is not disqualified unless he voluntarily quit work
"without good cause" or "without good cause attributable to the employer."9

Policy Behind Unemployment Compensation Acts. The basic
purpose of these acts is to provide the diligent worker with partial insurance against the hazards of economic insecurity by providing him
with benefit payments on the occasion of involuntary unemployment.10
Today, almost every unemployment compensation act declares this to
be the public policy. 11 A secondary aim of these acts is to serve the
general public interest by stabilizing employment, maintaining consumer purchasing power, preserving labor standards and increasing
labor mobility.12 The system of unemployment compensation is designed to insure the risk of short-term unemployment.
Experience Rating. The funds from which benefits are paid are
generally obtained from payroll taxes levied on employers. In the overwhelming majority of the states the rates are varied in some degree with
6 For the early development of disqualification provisions, see generally Malisoff, "The
Emergence of Unemployment Compensation," 54 PoL. Ser. Q. 237 (1939); Witte, "Development of Unemployment Compensation," 55 YALE L.J. 21 at 41 (1945). For the
British construction of the phrase "voluntarily leaves his employment" see BRlTISH UMPIRE
DECISIONS, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION lNTBRPRBTATION SERVICE, p. 101 (1938).
7 Kempfer, "Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct," 55 YALE L.J.
147 at 149 (1945).
8 Jn Montana a claimant is disqualified by any voluntary quitting whether there be
just cause or not.
9 Ohio limits disqualification to "just cause." In nine states and Hawaii, good cause
is restricted to good cause connected with the work, attributable to the employment or the
employer. In the other 29 states, Alaska and the District of Columbia, the general good
cause provision includes good personal cause. U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INsuRANCB LAws (as of Aug. 1954) p. 82.
10 The original reason for using the phrase "involuntary unemployment" was to provide support against constitutional attacks. Harrison, "Statutory Purpose and 'Involuntary
Unemployment,'" 55 YALE L.J. 117"at 118 (1945).
11 For example, N.J. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 43, §21-2; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952)
tit. 43, §752; 30 N.Y. Consol. Laws (Mcl&mey, 1950) Labor Law, §501.
12See ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WoRK 17 (1950).
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the past employment experience of each employer. This variation in
the employer's tax rate is known as experience rating. Almost all states
provide for such a plan, the purpose of which is to serve as an inducement for employers to stabilize employment in their businesses, i.e.,
the smaller the depletion in the employer's fund, the lower will be his
future compensation tax.13 In analyzing the voluntary character of a
claimant's departure from work, the procedure for financing the plans
must be considered since the courts generally refer to the adverse effect
on the employer's tax rates if benefits were allowed to those who are
not strictly "involuntarily unemployed." Where an employer has provided for pension benefits he may be required to bear the double
burden of contributing to both pension plans and the unemployment
compensation fund. However, he could probably shed a part of this
double burden by providing that pension payments are to be reduced
by the amount of any unemployment compensation recovered by the
employee.14

II. Retirement Is 'Voluntary"

If an employee is retired by his employer at a given age (there
being no provision to that effect in his individual employment contract),
it seems clear that he would be considered "involuntarily unemployed."15 Should the result be different when a labor union's representation is added? Does the collective bargaining agreement render
the termination "voluntary?"16 It has been argued that the answer
should be in the affirmative since the collective bargaining agreement
becomes, in effect, part of the employee's contract of employment.17
18 For the theories and methods of experience rating systems, see Arnold, "Experience
Rating," 55 YALE L.J. 218 (1945). Cf. Rainwater, "The Fallacy of Experience Rating,"
2 LAB. L.J. 95 (1951).
14BoYcE, How TO PLAN PENSIONS 31 (1950).
15 On the other hand, when an employee subscribes to a pension plan under which
he voluntarily agrees to retire at a given age, he cannot claim unemployment benefits upon
a theory that he has been discharged. Madison Gas and Elec. Co. v. Gardner and Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1951) CCH, EMPL. lNs. REP., p. 52535,
,i8602 Gust prior to retirement, claimant signed a statement, "I accept retirement"). Hall
v. Board of Review, 160 Pa. Super. 65, 49 A. (2d) 872 (1946).
16 A related problem is found where there is a general shutdown so that all eligible
employees may take their vacations simultaneously in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement between union and employer. Under these circumstances, are employees
who are not eligible for vacation pay, entitled to unemployment compensation for the period
covered by the shutdown? This problem is treated in detail in 30 A.L.R. (2d) 366 (1953).
Some courts have held that such unpaid employees are voluntarily unemployed on a theory
that the union is the employee's agent and that its action constituted an agreement on the
part of the employees to take an unpaid vacation. Most courts take the view that such
employees are out of work through no fault of their own and therefore are entitled to
benefits.
17 Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W. (2d)
449 (1951); Barclay White Co. v. Board of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A. (2d) 336, cert.
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The theories on which the courts enforce such agreements are diverse,1 8
but regardless of the theory used and the difficulty in fitting this situation into conventional contract concepts, such collective agreements are
valid and enforceable.19 Since the contract made by the union becomes
the contract of the employees and calls for their retirement by the company at a given age, the employees have made the matter compulsory
to the employer and have fixed the status of their retirement as voluntary. The claimant may not take a position calling for compulsory
retirement in his employment contract and then repudiate it in order
to claim involuntary unemployment for the purpose of unemployment
compensation benefits.20 By the collective agreement the union spoke
for the employees to the same extent as they could as individuals. Furthermore, it seems inconsistent with the purpose of the unemployment
compensation acts to permit employees to dictate through a strong union
the circumstances under which they will be eligible for unemployment
compensation.21

III. Retirement Is "Involuntary"
Equally persuasive arguments are presented to uphold the proposition that worker does not voluntarily leave work when he is "retired"
under a collective bargaining contract made for him by the union.
Since an individual employee might be in the minority as to specific
terms of a collective contract and yet be bound by its requirements,22
the conclusion that he individually consented to the terms of the agreement is pure fiction. Even though an employee is legally bound by the
den. 332 U.S. 761, 68 S.Ct. 63 (1947); In re Emp. Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co., 32
Wash. (2d) 205, 201 P. (2d) 194 (1948).
18 The three main theories used by the courts are (1) usage and custom theory (collective bargaining agreements establish usages which, unless expressly rejected by the
employee, are binding terms of the individual's employment); (2) third party beneficiary
theory (such agreements are :in the nature of a third party beneficiary contract); (3) agency
theory (the union is an agent for the employee). The first of these theories has definitely
lost favor with the courts :in recent years. The third theory is defective in that it would
be of no help to a non-union member, nor to one who joins a union subsequent to the
making of a contract, unless he later ratified it. For a discussion of these various theories,
see Rice, "Collective Labor Agreements in American Law,'' 44 HAnv. L. REv. 572 (1931);
TELLER, Luion D1sPtJTEs AND CoLLEcnvE BARGAINING §163 (1940).
1 9 TELLER, Luion DISPtJTES AND CoLLEcnvE BARGAINING §163 (1940). The union
even has power to enter into collective agreements adversely affecting the interests of some
of its members. O'Keefe v. Local 463, 277 N.Y. 300, 14 N.E. (2d) 77 (1938).
20 Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 24 N.J. Super. 311, 94 A. (2d) 514
(1953); Dept. of Industrial Relations v. Pesnell, 29 Ala. App. 528, 199 S. 720 (1940).
2 1 See Barclay White Co. v. Board of. Review, 356 Pa. 43 at 52, 50 A. (2d) 336, cert.
den. 332 U.S. 761, 68 S.Ct. 63 (1947).
22 Hartley v. Brotherhood, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938). It is also possible
that the worker was forced against his will to join the union if there was a closed or union
shop contract.
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union contract, this should not preclude him from unemployment
compensation when he is retired against his will by reason of the
agreement.23 The union-employer contract is a mutual agreement in
which each side has a voice. Thus there is merely a concurrent determination of the terms of employment. When an employee reaches the
specified age, the terms of employment expire; there is neither discharge
nor withdrawal. Applicants for jobs frequently must accept work even
though they are informed that it will last only for a stated period of
time. When the employee accepts a job which he knows in advance to
be temporary, his leaving at the specified time is not voluntary within
the meaning of the unemployment compensation acts. Although the
term of employment is longer, the retirement situation is not essentially
different. 24
It is argued that the legislatures intended to limit disqualification
to those separations resulting from a decision on the part of the worker
himself. In the "retirement" situation the employee does not exercise
his own volition in leaving his job. He has no alternative other than
to submit to the employer's retirement policy, no matter how that policy
was originated. Since one purpose of unemployment compensation is
to improve the position of the unemployed worker, the courts should
keep in mind this broad social aspect of the acts to permit a complete
realization of the legislatures' intent.25 Thus, many courts have said
that the acts must be liberally construed to further their remedial purpose and all doubts should be resolved in favor of those to be benefited.26

IV. Confusion Within the Courts
Many of the direct and collateral matters discussed by the courts
as bearing upon the problem of "involuntarily" leaving work must be
carefully examined before their true relevancy can be determined.
The first of these matters relates to the receipt of "retirement" pensions. Should the receipt of such pensions be determinative of an employee's statutory right to unemployment benefits? Two separate and
23 Where an employee has the option of retiring or continuing to work beyond the
retirement age (if the union and company agree to it), leaving work at the retirement age
disqualifies him from benefits. Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.
(2d) 277 (1953).
2 4 Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 100 A. (2d) 287 (1953).
25 Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Employment Cornn., (Cal. App. 1945) 158
P. (2d) 606.
26 illustrative are Henry A. Dreer, Inc. v. Board of Review, 127 N.J.L. 149 at 152,
21 A. (2d) 690 (1941); Calif. Employment Cornn. v. Black-Foxe Military Inst., 43 Cal.
App. (2d) 868 at 872, 110 P. (2d) 729 (1941); Bergen Point Iron Works v. Board of
Review, 137 N.J.L. 685 at 686, 61 A. (2d) 267 (1948).
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distinct problems are raised here. (I) Has the worker left his job
"without good cause?" Although the answer is not clear cut, it appears
that he would be disqualified from compensation. Absent contrary evidence, the inducement for leaving work would be deemed to be the
pension benefits, the receipt of which hardly constitutes "good cause."27
Some courts have confused this question with the related one of
whether the claimant's leaving was "involuntary." (2) Does the receipt of this income have any effect upon an unemployed worker's
position by reason of express statutory limitation? In only sixteen
states28 have the acts expressly eliminated or reduced the amount of
benefits for any week in which the claimant receives a pension from
his employer. In no state does receipt of income from sources not
connected with his job disqualify a claimant, since an employee need
not be indigent to secure the benefits provided by law. The statutory
scheme makes no provision for inquiring into an individual's financial
needs. 29
The second pitfall is found in the failure of some courts to limit
their analyses to the question of whether the claimant has "left work
voluntarily" within the meaning of the statute of the particular state.
Since all present unemployment compensation acts disqualify only
employees whose voluntary quitting lacks "good cause," it is possible
for a court to find that a worker who leaves "voluntarily" (in the volitional sense) with good cause is "involuntarily unemployed" and still
eligible for compensation. 30 But when an employee is automatically
"retired" at an age specified in a collective bargaining agreement, the
issue is solely whether the retirement is "voluntary." Only if a determination is made against the claimant (that he left of his own volition)
does the existence or non-existence of "good cause" enter the analysis.
21 U.S. BUREAu oF EMPLOYMENT SEc1lIIITY, UNEMPLOYMENT CoMPENSATION INTERPRETATION SERVICE-BENEFIT SERIES, vol. 5, no. 9, p. 242 (a 78-year-old coal miner
who was retired at his own request in order to be eligible to receive old-age pension held
to have left work voluntarily without good cause); Id., vol. 8, no. 6, p. 131 (a 65-year-old
blacksmith left his job after he became entitled to retire on a pension held to have left
work voluntarily without good cause when the policy of the employer was to permit employees to work after reaching retirement age); Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13
N.J. 447, 100 A. (2d) 277 (1953).
28 U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SEC1lIIITY, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT lNsURANCE l.Aws (as of Aug. 1954) p. 103. Cf. 35 MmN. L. REv. 610 (1950).
29 99 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 711 at 712 (1951); Friel v. Board of Review, 167 Pa. Super.
362, 75 A. (2d) 7 (1950).
30 Compare Dept. of Labor v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 133 Pa. Super.
518 at 520, 3 A. (2d) 211 (1938) with Teicher v. Board of Review, 154 Pa. Super. 250,
35 A. (2d) 739 (1944), and Billey Elec. Co. v. Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45
A. (2d) 898 (1946).
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Yet some courts discuss these issues interchangeably-as if they were
one and the same. A reference to one instance of this muddled thinking is made in the above discussion of pensions. If the issue is whether
the worker quit "involuntarily," the receipt of the pension should be
irrelevant. Not only may "good cause" be confused with the involuntary nature of the termination of employment, but once it is decided
that the leaving is voluntary the court may overlook the unlimited "good
cause" provision of its own statute and apply the more restrictive statute
of another jurisdiction.31 The use of alleged "precedents" is confusing
and dangerous when based upon a statute that is worded differently.
Thirdly, the courts have also merged at times the similar but separate considerations governing a worker's disqualification and eligibility, and have produced a confusing definition of "involuntary unemployment" by relating these problems to the availability-for-work issue·.32
A voluntary leaving of work may be evidence of an intent not to work.
Such an intent may, in tum, prove that the claimant is not available for
employment and is therefore ineligible for benefits.33 The ground of
ineligibility, however, is the intent not to work, not the voluntary
character of the leaving.
Finally, and of most importance, needless confusion has arisen by
"judicial excursions into the metaphysics of freedom of the will and
microscopic inspection of the volitional processes constituting the act
by which the claimant has become unemployed."34 In deciding that a
quitting was involuntary, some courts emphasize that the employee's
claim to benefits is determined by his motives at the time of the termination. Such an analysis is not entirely realistic, however, when a
union, as the worker's agent, has negotiated the retirement contract.
On the other hand, a conclusion that the employee left voluntarily
because the union acted in his stead at the bargaining table indicates
that any termination of employment is voluntary if consensual. But
this assumption is not always true. Such an approach would meet with
difficult factual determinations, e.g., did the company or the union have
the upper hand during the bargaining. The volitional test postulates
31 See note 9 supra for the various types of statutes. Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of
Review, 24 N.J. Super. 311, 94 A. (2d) 514 (1953), followed this tendency by stressing
the fact that retirement was compulsory to the employer, notwithstanding the fact that
this was of no special importance under a New Jersey type statute. For a view that an
"employer's fault" concept has no place in the unemployment compensation program, see
Simrell, "Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment Compensation,'' 55 YALE L.J. 181 (1945); 17 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 447 (1949).
32Valenti v. Board of Review, 4 N.J. 287, 72 A. (2d) 516 (1950).
33 Bliley Elec. Co. v. Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 549, 45 A. (2d) 898 (1946).
34 28 N.Y. Umv. L. REv. 1332 at 1334 (1953).
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an inquiry into the dynamics of the circumstances which created the
unemployment, but such inquiry does not adequately explain the results. The above factors indicate that any analysis which relies mainly
upon consensual relations is inaccurate. The situation contemplated
by the unemployment compensation acts involved a unilateral decision
on the part of the worker or the employer, not one in which a union
has previously negotiated a specific date for retirement. It has been
urged that in view of the general purpose of the unemployment compensation laws, the test as to whether unemployment is voluntary
should be determined by the employee's willingness to be in the labor
market (assuming that his prior leaving of work was for "good cause")
and not by the relationship existing between employee and employer. 35

V. Conclusion
The age composition of the United States' population is undergoing a substantial shift upwards. 36 With this advancing age, the
number of workers who are retired or are facing retirement will be
growing every year. Scientific advances have prolonged the life expectancy of the average employee, but social and economic development
have placed age limitations upon his employment activity. In view of
the obstacles confronting an older person in obtaining new employment, a decision that he left "voluntarily" and is therefore not entitled
to benefits might serve to reverse to some extent the social and legislative trend toward providing honorable alternatives to "poor relief."37
If it is determined that unemployment compensation is recoverable in
the "retirement" cases, an employer may use this fact in his negotiations with the union for retirement and pension plans. A decision that
a worker did not quit "voluntarily" will also protect employees who
are retired in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement but are
unable to qualify for pension benefits. Thus, the amount received from
unemployment benefits could act as a Hoor which all workers would
receive as a consequence of these retirement plans. 38 A further basis
for holding such a leaving "involuntary" might be found in statutory
provisions which prohibit an individual from waiving or releasing his
35 Harrison, "Statutory Purpose and 'Involuntary Unemployment,'" 55 YALB L.J.
117 (1945).
36 In the 1950 census, 8% (or 12 million) of the total population were 65 years and
over, and 3 million of them were in the labor force. Bancroft, "Older Persons in the Labor
Force," 279 .ANNALS 52 at 53 (1952).
37W. T. Grant Co. v. Board of Review, 129 N.J.L. 402 at 405, 29 A. (2d) 858
(1943).
38 Ar.:rMAN, AvAILAllILITY FOR Wonx 18 (1950).
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rights to unemployment benefits.39 Since, absent agreement, forced
retirement would constitute "involuntary" unemployment, if the bargaining agreement renders the retirement "voluntary" the claimant is
waiving his right to unemployment compensation by entering into the
retirement contract. 40
These policy arguments indicate that those courts and administrative tribunals which have decided that the worker's leaving is "involuntary" have reached a desirable result. As discussed earlier, however,
the analyses used in arriving at that result have not always been as
satisfactory. A close inspection of the interrelation between the employer, the employee and his union bargaining agent raises collateral
issues which border on being superfluous. Considerations of public
and legislative policy, as discussed above, furnish all the foundation
necessary to arrive at a sound decision.

Lawrence N. Ravick, S.Ed.

89Wash. Laws (Rem. Supp. 1945) §9998-321; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon 1952) tit. 43,
§861; 43 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 43, §2l-15(a).
40 Glover v. Simmons Co., 31 N.J. Super. 308, 106 A. (2d) 318 (1954).

